A series of stresses on the global fuel supply chain highlight New Zealand’s vulnerability to fuel price shocks and shortages, and the need to reimagine how we secure our future.
What started as a crisis in just crude oil supply has morphed into a much wider crisis in the delivery of fuel.
Refined diesel is the place where the accumulating pressures are most apparent, accentuated by President Trump now weighing a ban on US exports of diesel that would trigger a global scramble for supplies.
Such a move would raise prices significantly higher and the timing could include the pre/post election period.
But it’s just one potential manifestation of a new phase of the fuels crisis.
Dumb luck played a big part in getting us through the first phase.
Global prices rose only moderately on average, and fuel kept arriving despite the heavy squeeze on tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
But we now enter a second phase where fuel supply is fragile across multiple dimensions of the system, with greater risk of higher prices and outright shortages.
This new period is marked by serious stresses in global refining capacity and the tenuous status of the Red Sea shipping route that has accounted for 5% of global oil supply in recent times. And all against the backdrop of the unknown degree of restrictions that will apply on the Hormuz strait in any given week.
New Zealand spent $9 billion on fuel imports in the year before the gulf war began, and two thirds more on this June quarter than last years’. That’s 60% of all dairy export returns – just on fuel.
The economics of using local fuel substitutes for land transport have only become stronger as the technology improves, particularly for electric vehicles, and sustained high fuel prices further enhance the equation.
But it’s the risks that come from being so exposed to fuel shortages – risks to the economy and serious chunks of our sovereignty – that are more tangible now and underscore the urgency for making the shift. The exposure is far greater than similar countries we benchmark against and involves not just geopolitical risks but climate induced disruption and more.
We need a plan to drive a transition that optimises for risk and cost between today’s fuels and local substitutes – a Resilience Plan for Transport Services.
A lot can be changed at little or no cost and we need to get the numbers done on the rest to see where the trade-offs are and what’s affordable over different periods. What we can’t afford is to have no plan and to not reimagine our future.
The Crunch that Didn’t Come – When Expected
A number of things combined to get us through the first phase of the crisis, but it was China’s response that was the lucky break.
Back in May, oil industry specialists from Exxon’s CEO on down warned of a supply crunch in the northern summer, as stocks of fuels were dwindling.
It was well known that China had built up large crude oil stocks, allowing it to reduce imports for quite some time when prices were highest and the Hormuz strait was most constrained.
But the extent to which the penetration of electric vehicles in the Chinese fleet allowed consumers to fuel switch and deliver big reductions in use was not foreseen. Altogether, China imported 4.4 million barrels a day less in June than the previous year’s average. This amounted to a quarter of oil imports being cut when constraints peaked – or 4% of global demand.
The release of fuel stored in other countries accounted for another 3 million barrels a day. And together with further demand destruction in nations beyond China and the oil that did still exit the Persian Gulf, markets managed to balance at prices that were elevated though well below what was first feared.
Important to that has been Saudi Arabia’s ability to divert 4-5 million barrels a day of its production via pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu and so bypass the Hormuz strait.
Then in the space of a few days in mid-September, the Houthis in western Yemen managed to capture considerable stretches of that Red Sea coast, including at the Bab al-Mandab strait, at the same time as a drone attack on the Saudi pipeline forced its temporary closure.
Saudi Arabia has not formally surrendered the route yet, and has in any case managed to get considerable additional volumes out through the Hormuz strait by employing small shuttle tankers to take oil to waiting large crude carriers in waters beyond – thereby putting only the less valuable tankers at risk.
But the high level picture is that the Red Sea route is becoming increasingly unviable, meaning that: “instead of 40‑45 per cent of pre-war flows through the Strait of Hormuz needed to keep global oil and refined product inventories unchanged, 65‑70 per cent of pre-war flows are now required” according to Australia’s Commonwealth Bank.
So not only would a lot more oil need to get through the Hormuz strait, it is then all under the direct influence of Iran via the one choke point.
Iran made clear in the opening weeks of the conflict that it would use asymmetric warfare to hit the economies of the US and those who might influence both it and Israel.
But as the US has changed tactics from physical bombardment to isolating the economy and blocking Iran’s oil exports, to what extent Tehran will further constrict oil movements remains unclear. In particular, it’s unclear whether Iran would move to impact the US midterm elections on November 3 – just four days before New Zealand’s election.
However Iran may not have to do much for there to be a step change, as it’s not just crude oil supplies that are under pressure.
Oil Market Infrastructure Already Straining
Global refining capacity was tight before the gulf war and has now been further diminished by losses of plant from Iranian attacks in the gulf region and Ukrainian attacks on Russia.
Ukraine’s targeting of oil infrastructure has seen Russia not just reduce diesel exports to less than 40% of the previous year, but forced it to import petrol.
“In the space of a summer, Russia, once the world’s second-largest producer of crude oil, has been plunged into a desperate scramble to find sources of gasoline to plug the ever-growing holes in its refining capacity” the Guardian notes.
These impacts together with China’s caps on fuel exports have effectively slashed global refining capacity by as much as 10% Bloomberg reports – further undermining supply security.
“The constraint pain point in the energy system is refining,” according to Exxon’s chief financial officer Neil Hansen.
Resulting demand for US diesel exports has in turn seen the domestic price climb relentlessly to more than double pre-war levels, resulting in cost of living pressures across the economy.
This has led President Trump to propose that the US ban diesel exports, in a bid to lower US prices before the midterm elections. But that would significantly impact other countries – and so major US trading partners.
“Of the 8 million barrels of diesel traded globally by sea each day, the U.S. supplies about 1.5 million of them – about 20%. An export ban would remove the single largest source of global diesel from the market, and the consequences could be catastrophic” said economic analysts Zerohedge.
Westpac Chief Economist Kelly Eckhold says it would be “a bit of a nuclear bomb hitting the refined fuels market”.
A ban would initially hit Europe, as diesel from the US made up half of its imports in August.
But removal of those US supplies would then send the former European and Latin American buyers into other markets and directly compete with companies seeking to supply New Zealand – sending a diesel price shock here too.
And it’s not just refining capability that is under stress. Oil tanker hire rates have hit record highs due to the longer trade routes needed to lower risk – which in turn reduce volumes deliverable with the same fleet. Overall, tanker charges can be worth as much as $30 a barrel and a shortage of supertankers has emerged.
At the same time, Ukraine has significantly improved its ability to identify ‘shadow fleet’ tankers carrying sanctioned Russian oil – by getting legitimate carriers to volunteer information about their transits. Following this, the drone strike rate has stepped up and is taking out capacity at the other end of the tanker fleet.
So even if crude supplies hold up, there are worrying signs of stress in the overall global fuel supply system.
The Geopolitics of Fuel Allocation
Should crude supplies become squeezed further for whatever reason, the first result will be a rise in oil prices. If there is a serious shock to the system then analysts are picking $150 to $200 a barrel, compared to around $100 a barrel today, and $70 pre-war.
To what extent additional price rises from this or the refining squeeze would dampen demand and restore supply balance is uncertain but it’s not the root question, as oil is not trading in a conventional market.
Supply is being constrained by geopolitics, and oil’s distribution is similarly dictated by geopolitics the more there is a risk of fuel shortages.
That’s why oil remains at risk of not trading on price alone – but also on access.
And that underlines why in this crisis, supply security is ultimately not about stocks of fuel – it’s about deals with oil producers, as earlier outlined in Newsroom.
At the point there is not enough supply to meet demand, allocation will be far from equal.
No oil producing nations will be going short so they will continue to take supplies in line with the close to half of global supply they consumed pre-war, resulting in the shortage being magnified for others.
And geopolitics will ensure that oil importing countries with economic strength or critical materials will be much less affected.
But import-dependent nations with little geopolitical muscle like New Zealand are disproportionately at risk the more other countries lock in deals with oil producers.
Japan, which is similarly 100% dependent on fuel imports, has responded by scouring the world to lock in deals with countries outside the Persian Gulf including: the United States, Mexico, Canada Nigeria, Angola, South Sudan, and Azerbaijan.
Australia too has become serious about fuel security with its May budget providing for A$7.5 billion in new spending on this.
New Zealand however provisioned just $150 million for fuel security in the same budget round – 8% of Australia’s commitment when adjusted for the population difference.
Much of that went into acquiring another nine days’ worth of diesel stocks, which while useful for managing volatility, does little to confront the nature of this crisis – as it’s ultimately not a stocks game. Real security requires direct arrangements with oil producers and refiners.
What New Zealand Can Do
Getting oil from sources such as those Japan has been diversifying into is not requiring much of a premium at present – around $10 a barrel. The costs of getting oil out of high risk areas is currently being absorbed by the producers in general – with Iraq for example discounting US$43 a barrel on recent sales.
What securing oil supplies would require is the government being willing to make the deals in a way that successfully interfaces with the dominant fuel wholesalers. It is essentially about politics rather than economics.
This involves ultimately obtaining refined fuels rather than just crude, which makes the task more complex. Until April 2022, New Zealand had much of its own refining needs covered by plant at Marsden Point. It was a versatile refinery capable of cracking a wide variety of crudes but its continued operation did not suit the interests of fuel wholesalers who owned a majority share in it.
A workaround may be available through Singapore’s extensive refining capacity, but as Australia is likely to have priority access to that capacity in a time of significant shortage, capacity rights would need to be explicitly negotiated in advance – something beyond the current agreement between the two countries that just protects commercial trade against interference by governments.
The November election is now close enough that there is little chance of fuel shortages occurring in New Zealand before then, due to the lag time for supplies already on the water to New Zealand and the stocks already held locally. However, if concerns about supply do manifest in the next few months then the merits of contracting directly with producers may become more apparent.
And in the background there is the risk that a move by Trump or Tehran that aims to impact the US midterm elections will also impact New Zealand’s one.
Prime Minister Luxon reconvened the ministerial fuel group on 21 September after a long time in abeyance.
If major questions come to the committee before a new government is sworn in, it would be important to also have members of opposition parties around the table as the sums at stake could be large and the choices critical.
Simon Terry is the Sustainability Council’s Executive Director
This article first appeared in Newsroom on 1 October 2026.

